


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15 September 1960



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
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IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- 25X1
- A. [No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future.]
- B. [No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.]
- C. [Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action continue to exist in Laos, the Middle East, and in the Congo. In Laos, the continuing differences between opposing elements which led to General Phoumi's formation of a new revolutionary group favor Communist exploitation, including increased Pathet Lao military activity.

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[redacted] In the Congo, Soviet actions and statements indicate that the USSR will continue to provide unilateral political and material support to Lumumba.

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DAILY BRIEF

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LATE ITEMS

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*Laos: King Savang, in a conversation with Ambassador Brown in Luang Prabang on 13 September, asserted that Premier Souvanna Phouma had "full powers" to deal with the revolt led by General Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum, saying he should either use his authority or resign and permit the King to appoint a new premier. The King stated that the opposing views of Souvanna and Phoumi on how to deal with the Pathet Lao problem were irreconcilable, and he clearly indicated his support for Phoumi's position that negotiations with the Pathet Lao would prove disastrous.]

[Souvanna, when informed of the King's attitude, stated that if Savang persisted in withholding his support, he would have no recourse but to resign. The premier flew to Luang Prabang on 14 September to see the King; his decision on whether to resign or not will presumably depend on the outcome of the interview. Souvanna has also been considering the possibility of appealing to the UN Security Council, on the grounds that civil war in Laos would quickly become internationalized. He believes that South Vietnam and Thailand would side with Phoumi. This would provide Communist China and North Vietnam the pretext they have been seeking for intervention in Laos.]

no

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DAILY BRIEF

iii

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Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

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The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

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National Security Agency

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